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Abstract
We consider a situation in which agents have mutual claims on each other, sum-
marized in a liability matrix. Agents’ assets might be insufficient to satisfy their
liabilities leading to defaults. In case of default, bankruptcy rules are used to specify
the way agents are going to be rationed. A clearing payment matrix is a payment
matrix consistent with the prevailing bankruptcy rules that satisfies limited liability
and priority of creditors. Since clearing payment matrices and the corresponding
values of equity are not uniquely determined, we provide bounds on the possible lev-
els equity can take. Unlike the existing literature, which studies centralized clearing
procedures, we introduce a large class of decentralized clearing processes. We show
the convergence of any such process in finitely many iterations to the least clearing
payment matrix. When the unit of account is sufficiently small, all decentralized
clearing processes lead essentially to the same value of equity as a centralized clear-
ing procedure. As a policy implication, it is not necessary to collect and process
all the sensitive data of all the agents simultaneously and run a centralized clearing
procedure.
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1 Introduction
The treatment of bankruptcy of countries, banks, firms, organizations, and individuals will
always be a challenge for society. In the original bankruptcy problem, starting with the
seminal paper of O’Neill (1982), there is a single bankrupt agent and the other agents
have claims on the estate of the bankrupt agent. In this paper, we analyze networks of
agents, where agents have mutual claims on each other. An agent is characterized by his
endowments and his liabilities towards the other agents. The assets of an agent consist of
the sum of his endowments and the payments received from other agents having liabilities
to him.
If the assets of an agent are not sufficient to satisfy his own liabilities, then the agent
has to default. In a network setting, a default can also result from contagion, where an
agent defaults only because other agents are not fully paying their liabilities to him. The
default of a single agent can therefore result in domino effect that potentially leads to an
all encompassing cascade of defaults. We are interested in the final resulting outcome in
terms of payments and equity and in particular in the question whether one needs to use
centralized clearing procedures as is assumed in the systemic risk literature, or whether
one can rely on decentralized clearing processes as introduced in this paper instead.
An important application of our model concerns financial networks, where Eisenberg
and Noe (2001) is the seminal paper. Recent crisis on financial markets triggered by the
Lehman bankruptcy as well as sovereign debt problems of European countries provide
prime examples of why the network perspective is important. Part of the literature on
financial networks concerns the appropriate measurement of systemic risk, see Chen et al.
(2013) for an axiomatic approach as well as Demange (2015). There is also a substantial
literature that relates the number and magnitude of defaults to the network topology and
that characterizes those structures that tend to propagate default, see Gai and Kapadia
(2010), Elliott et al. (2014), Acemoglu et al. (2015), Capponi et al. (2015), and Glasserman
and Young (2015). The basic setup of Eisenberg and Noe (2001) has also been extended in
various directions, for instance in Cifuentes et al. (2005) and Shin (2008) by allowing for
liquidity considerations and in Rogers and Veraart (2013) by allowing for costs of default.
Given the prominence of the financial applications, we use the terminology of that
framework, but want to emphasize that our model is relevant outside that specific setup.
Indeed, network effects of defaults occur also outside financial settings. Brown (1979)
presents an application of a supply chain network consisting of coal mines and power
companies, where due to a strike only the non-union mines produce and the other mines
default on their deliveries of coal. Another example is related to international student
exchange problems, as well as the closely related problem of tuition exchange studied in
Dur and U¨nver (2015), where the agents correspond to colleges. The endowments of a
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college equal the maximum net inflow of students it can handle, its liabilities correspond
to commitments made to receive incoming students, and claims are the agreements with
other colleges to send outgoing students. As another example, the agents can be servers
that process jobs for a set of users. The endowments of a server correspond to its capacity
for processing jobs, its liabilities to jobs that it has to process for other servers, and its
claims to jobs that are outsourced to other servers. An example similar to the one with
servers concerns time banks, where the agents are workers instead of servers.
A clearing payment matrix describes how much the agents pay to each other. The lit-
erature on financial networks has presented a number of algorithms to compute a clearing
payment matrix and emphasize the computation of the greatest clearing payment ma-
trix. Examples of such algorithms are presented in Eisenberg and Noe (2001), Rogers and
Veraart (2013), and Elliott et al. (2014). These algorithms correspond to centralized pro-
cedures for finding a clearing payment matrix. The required levels of payments during the
execution of the algorithm are typically not implementable and are computed by solving
a joint optimization program or a simultaneous system of equations.
As noted in Elsinger et al. (2006) and Gai and Kapadia (2010), the complexity of
the financial system means that policymakers have only partial information about the true
linkages between financial intermediaries. It is therefore not realistic to assume that a single
decision maker has all the information that is needed for the execution of the algorithms.
On top of that, it is not realistic to assume that all assets of defaulting agents can be
liquidated instantaneously.
Whereas the entire literature on systemic risk has considered centralized procedures to
compute a clearing payment matrix, we introduce a large class of decentralized clearing
processes in this paper. At each point in time, an agent is selected by means of a process
that is potentially history-dependent and stochastic. This agent would typically be an
agent that has filed for bankruptcy. Next, the selected agent makes any amount of feasible
payments to the other agents. The amount that is paid depends only on local information
and is determined by a process that again is potentially history-dependent and stochastic.
The only requirement that we make is that the selected agent be eligible, that is can make
a positive incremental payment without ending up with negative equity.
To define the class of decentralized clearing processes, it is mathematically convenient to
express all quantities in some smallest unit of account (dollars, number of students, number
of jobs, etc.) and work in a discrete setup. We also show that our main result, on finite
convergence of any decentralized clearing process in our class, is not true in the perfectly
divisible case. The discrete setup has also been analyzed in the bankruptcy literature with
multiple claimants on a single estate, see Young (1994) Moulin (2000), Moulin and Stong
(2002), Herrero and Mart´ınez (2008), and Chen (2015), but so far not in a network setting
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and the emphasis in that literature is on the axiomatic foundation of allocation rules. All
papers in the systemic risk literature stick to the perfectly divisible approach.
We think of the discrete model as being more general than the perfectly divisible model.
On the one hand, using integers, we can study all the financial applications, where the unit
of account can be taken to be one cent or one dollar and it is really a matter of mathematical
convenience whether one uses a model with integers or reals. At the same time, we can
study all the applications where indivisibilities matter like the mentioned applications of
international student exchange or job processing by a network of servers, where realism
dictates the use of integers rather than reals.
If an agent is bankrupt, then a bankruptcy rule specifies how the liabilities of vari-
ous creditors are going to be settled. Following the seminal paper by Eisenberg and Noe
(2001), the literature on systemic risk in financial networks has adopted proportional rules
specifying payment ratios less than one in case of default. In reality, not all the liabilities
are of the same seniority and some of the liabilities are more senior than others. American
bankruptcy law, for instance, is a mixed lexicographic-proportional system, see Kaminski
(2000). We therefore allow for general bankruptcy rules and present a convenient repre-
sentation for them.
A clearing payment matrix is characterized by the properties of feasibility, limited
liability, and priority of creditors. Feasibility of a payment matrix means that payments
are made in accordance with bankruptcy rules. Limited liability means the payment matrix
should result in non-negative equity levels for all agents. Priority of creditors requires that
if an agent is not paying all of its liabilities, then a higher payment should lead to a negative
equity level.
We characterize all clearing payment matrices as a fixed point of an appropriately de-
fined function. We show that there exist a least and a greatest clearing payment matrix.
Unlike the perfectly divisible case, different clearing payment matrices may result in dif-
ferent amounts of equity. We provide lower and upper bounds on the maximum difference
in equity value that results from two different clearing payment matrices.
We show that any decentralized process in a large class converges in finitely many
iterations to the least clearing payment matrix. In this sense, the cost of decentralization
is therefore to go from the greatest to the least clearing payment matrix. The bounds
we derive on the final levels of equity show that this cost is typically small in financial
applications. Thus as a policy implication for financial applications, instead of working
on collecting and processing data centrally, we suggest that it is sufficient to have local
liquidators enforcing bankruptcy rules.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model of financial networks,
the representation of bankruptcy rules, and some examples. Section 3 defines clearing
3
payment matrices. In Section 4 we analyze clearing payment matrices as fixed points and
derive the bounds for the difference in equity value that results from two different clearing
payment matrices. Section 5 introduces a large class of decentralized clearing processes
and shows how any process in this class converges to the least clearing payment matrix in
a finite number of iterations. Section 6 deals with the relationship between the discrete
and the perfectly divisible case. Section 7 concludes.
2 Financial Networks
In the bankruptcy literature, there is typically a single bankrupt agent and the estate is
an exogenously given amount.1 The emphasis of the analysis is on the study of normative
properties of different bankruptcy rules. The systemic risk literature invariably uses the
proportional bankruptcy rule. In that literature there are multiple defaulting agents and
the estates are endogenously determined. In this section, we develop our model of financial
networks that combines insights from both literatures.
The primitives of a financial network are given by the tuple (z, L, b).
Let N0 denote the natural numbers including 0. The vector z ∈ NI0 represents the
endowments of the agents in the finite set of agents I with cardinality n. The endowment
of an agent includes all his tangible and intangible assets, but excludes the claims and
liabilities such an agent has towards the other agents. We work in the space of natural
numbers, so implicitly it is assumed that everything is expressed in a smallest unit of
account, which could be one dollar or one cent in the financial applications.
The n×n liability matrix L ∈ NI×I0 describes the mutual claims of the agents. Its entry
Lij is the liability of agent i towards agent j or, equivalently, the claim of agent j on agent
i. We make the normalizing assumption that Lii = 0 for all i ∈ I. In general, it can occur
that agent i has a liability towards agent j and agent j has a liability towards agent i, so
both Lij > 0 and Lji > 0 can occur simultaneously.
The payments to be made by agent i ∈ I to the other agents are determined by the
bankruptcy rule bi : N0 → NI0 of agent i. Given a value Ei ∈ N0 of the estate of agent i, the
1For surveys of the literature on bankruptcy problems, we refer the reader to Thomson (2003), Thom-
son (2013), and Thomson (2015). There is also an emerging literature on the extension of the bankruptcy
literature to network settings. The emphasis in these papers is on the axiomatic foundation of allocation
rules. Bjørndal and Jo¨rnsten (2010) analyze generalized bankruptcy problems with multiple estates as
flow sharing problems and define the nucleolus and the constrained egalitarian solution for such problems.
Moulin and Sethuraman (2013) consider bipartite rationing problems, where agents can have claims on
a subset of unrelated estates. They consider whether rules for single resource problems can be consis-
tently extended to their framework. Groote Schaarsberg et al. (2013) axiomatize the Aumann-Maschler
bankruptcy rule in financial networks with general division rules.
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monetary amount bij(Ei) ∈ N0 specifies how much agent i has to pay to agent j ∈ I. The
tuple (bi)i∈I of bankruptcy rules is denoted by b.
Contrary to the bankruptcy literature, the value of the estate Ei of agent i ∈ I is
endogenously determined in a financial network, since it depends not only on the initial
endowments of agent i, but also on the claims i has on other agents, part of which may
not be received by agent i. Exactly how the value of the estate is endogenously determined
is one of the important aspects studied in this paper and is addressed in the subsequent
sections.
We make the following assumption on bankruptcy rules.
Assumption 1. Let (z, L, b) be a financial network. For every i ∈ I, the bankruptcy rule
bi is a monotonic function bi : N0 → NI0 such that:
1. For every Ei ∈ N0,
∑
j∈I bij(Ei) ≤ min{
∑
j∈I Lij, Ei} with equality if
∑
j∈I Lij ≤ Ei.
2. For every Ei ∈ N0, for every j ∈ I, bij(Ei) ≤ Lij.
3. For every Ei, E
′
i ∈ N0 such that Ei ≤ E ′i,
∑
j∈I bij(E
′
i) ≤ Ei implies bi(Ei) = bi(E ′i).
Assumption 1 requires the bankruptcy rule bi to be monotonic: For every Ei, E
′
i ∈ N0
such that Ei ≤ E ′i it holds for every j ∈ I that bij(Ei) ≤ bij(E ′i) or, equivalently, bi(Ei) ≤
bi(E
′
i). A weakly higher value of the estate leads to weakly higher payments to all agents.
This property is called resource monotonicity in the bankruptcy literature, see Thomson
(2003), or endowment monotonicity, see Thomson (2015).
Assumption 1.1 allows for the possibility that
∑
j∈I bij(Ei) < Ei if Ei <
∑
j∈I Lij. Some
of the estate may not be distributed among the agents in case the estate falls below the total
value of the liabilities. We will illustrate how fairness considerations, like the fairness norm
that equal claimants should receive an equal payment, can be at odds with the requirement
that
∑
j∈I bij(Ei) = Ei whenever Ei <
∑
j∈I Lij. At the same time, we present several rules
that do satisfy the requirement that
∑
j∈I bij(Ei) = Ei whenever Ei <
∑
j∈I Lij, so such
rules are by no means excluded.
Assumption 1.2 specifies that a claimant never receives more than the value of his claim.
Assumption 1.3 puts limits on the extent to which paying less than the estate is possible.
If total payments made at the higher estate E ′i do not exceed the value of the lower estate
Ei, than those are also the payments made at Ei.
We continue by presenting a convenient representation for bankruptcy rules. The image
Fi of a bankruptcy rule bi determines the set of feasible payments. More formally, we have
Fi = bi(N0) = ∪{Ei∈N0|Ei≤∑j∈I Lij}{bi(Ei)},
where the second equality follows from the observation that by Assumptions 1.1 and 1.2
it holds that bi(Ei) = Li whenever Ei ≥
∑
j∈I Lij. The set of feasible payments Fi can
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be found by considering the value of the bankruptcy rule for integer values of the estate
between zero and the total amount of claims.
Assumption 1.3 corresponds to the requirement that bankruptcy rules impose maximal
feasible payments. Indeed, bi(Ei) is the maximal vector in Fi for which the sum of the
components is less than or equal to Ei. Notice that the monotonicity of bi implies that
≤ is a total order on the set Fi, i.e. the order ≤ on Fi is antisymmetric, transitive, and
complete. A maximal vector in Fi for which the sum of the components is less than or
equal to Ei is therefore uniquely determined.
Vice versa, any set Ti ⊂ NI0, which is totally ordered by ≤, contains 0I , and has Li as a
maximum, pins down a bankruptcy rule bTii with set of feasible payments equal to Ti. For
Ei ∈ N0, let
bTii (Ei) = max{fi ∈ Ti |
∑
j∈Ifij ≤ Ei}, (1)
where the maximum in (1) is unique since Ti is a finite set, Ti contains 0
I , and ≤ is a total
order on Ti. The following proposition states that b
Ti
i indeed satisfies Assumption 1.
Proposition 1. For every i ∈ I, let Ti be a subset of NI0, which is totally ordered by ≤,
contains 0I , and with maxTi = Li. Then the tuple of induced bankruptcy rules (b
Ti
i )i∈I
satisfies Assumption 1.
Proof. Let some i ∈ I be given. Clearly, it holds that bTii is a monotonic function from
N0 into NI0.
If
∑
j∈I Lij ≤ Ei, then
bTii (Ei) = max{fi ∈ Ti |
∑
j∈Ifij ≤ Ei} = Li,
where the second equality follows since
∑
j∈I Lij ≤ Ei. In this case, we therefore have that∑
j∈Ib
Ti
ij (Ei) = min{
∑
j∈ILij, Ei}.
If
∑
j∈I Lij > Ei, then∑
j∈Ib
Ti
ij (Ei) ≤ Ei = min{
∑
j∈ILij, Ei},
where the inequality follows immediately from the definition of bTii (Ei). Assumption 1.1 is
therefore satisfied.
Since Ti is totally ordered by ≤, we have, for every fi ∈ Ti, fi ≤ maxTi = Li. It
now follows that, for every Ei ∈ N0, for every j ∈ I, bTiij (E) ≤ Lij. This shows that
Assumption 1.2 holds.
Let Ei, E
′
i ∈ N0 be such that Ei ≤ E ′i and
∑
j∈I b
Ti
ij (E
′
i) ≤ Ei. Since
bTii (E
′
i) = max{fi ∈ Ti |
∑
j∈Ifij ≤ E ′i}
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and
∑
j∈I b
Ti
ij (E
′
i) ≤ Ei, it follows that
bTii (Ei) = max{fi ∈ Ti |
∑
j∈Ifij ≤ Ei} = bTii (E ′i).
We have shown that Assumption 1.3 holds. 2
An important class of bankruptcy rules consists of the priority bankruptcy rules. They
depend on a permutation pi : I → {1, . . . , n}, which indicates the rank of the various
liabilities. For j ∈ I, we define
pij = {i ∈ I | pi(i) < pi(j)}
as the set of agents ranked before agent j according to pi.
Definition 1. Given a vector of liabilities Li ∈ NI0 of agent i ∈ I and a permutation
pi : I → {1, . . . , n}, the priority bankruptcy rule bpii : N0 → NI0 is defined by
bpiij(Ei) = max{0,min{Lij, Ei −
∑
k∈pij
Lik}}, j ∈ I, Ei ∈ N0.
Under the bankruptcy rule bpii , the estate of agent i has a priority list of creditors as
determined by the permutation pi. The claims of agents pi−1(1), pi−1(2), . . . are paid for
sequentially as long as the estate of agent i permits this.
A priority bankruptcy rule clearly satisfies Assumption 1. It also has the property
that
∑
j∈I bij(Ei) = min{Ei,
∑
j∈I Lij} for every Ei ∈ N0, so the equality also holds in
case
∑
j∈I Lij > Ei. Priority bankruptcy rules have nice axiomatic foundations. As has
been demonstrated in Moulin (2000) these are the only rules satisfying consistency, upper
composition, and lower composition.2
Another frequently used bankruptcy rule is the proportional bankruptcy rule. It is
easily defined when the estate and the payments are treated as real numbers. Given a
vector of liabilities Li ∈ RI0, the function dpropi : R+ → RI+ is defined by
dpropij (Ei) = min{Lij, Lij∑
k∈I Lik
Ei}, j ∈ I, Ei ∈ R+.
2Consistency imposes that in case an agent leaves with the payment as described by the bankruptcy rule,
then applying the bankruptcy rule to the smaller problem does not change the payments of the remaining
agents. Upper composition requires that first applying the bankruptcy rule using a too optimistic value
of the estate and using the resulting payments as the liabilities for the correct value of the estate leads
to the same payments as directly applying the bankruptcy rule to the correct value of the estate. Lower
composition is the dual of upper composition. It requires that first applying the bankruptcy rule using
a too pessimistic value of the estate, revising the liabilities accordingly, and then dividing the remainder
of the estate leads to the same result as directly applying the bankruptcy rule to the correct value of the
estate.
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Under the function dpropij , the estate is divided in proportion to the liabilities. If the estate
exceeds the sum of the liabilities, then every claimant receives his claim.3
The function dpropij may not lead to integers, even if the estate is an integer. It is for
this reason that Moulin (2000) describes the priority rules as the most natural rationing
methods in the discrete model.
There are many ways to define a proportional rule while taking the integer require-
ments into account. We present two such constructions here leading to the fair propor-
tional bankruptcy rule and the quota bankruptcy rule, respectively. The fair proportional
bankruptcy rule is based on the fairness principle that agents with equal claims should
receive equal payments.
Given a set X ⊂ RI+, we define
bXc = {f ∈ NI0 | ∃x ∈ X such that f = bxc},
where bxc denotes the vector obtained by taking for every i ∈ I the floor of xi, the largest
integer which is less than or equal to xi.
Definition 2. Given a vector of liabilities Li ∈ NI0 of agent i ∈ I, the fair proportional
bankruptcy rule bpropi : N0 → NI0 is defined by
bpropi = b
bdpropi (R+)c
i .
Under the fair proportional bankruptcy rule, all possible real-valued payment vectors
dpropi (R+) are first rounded down to obtain the set of feasible payments Ti = bdpropi (R+)c.
Next, the fair proportional bankruptcy rule bpropi is defined by setting it equal to the
bankruptcy rule bTii induced by Ti. Clearly, b
prop
i satisfies the fairness criterion that equal
claimants receive an equal payment.
It is easily verified that bdpropi (R+)c satisfies the conditions of Proposition 1, so bpropi
satisfies Assumption 1.
We illustrate the definitions of bankruptcy rule and set of feasible payments in the
following example.
Example 1. We have three agents I = {1, 2, 3}. Agent 1 has an initial endowment z1 = 1
and his liabilities are L1 = (0, 2, 2) as presented in Table 1. We assume that agents 2 and 3
have no liabilities, so the estate of agent 1 is equal to his initial endowment, E1 = z1 = 1.
The network aspect is not relevant for this example and the only problem is therefore to
divide the estate of agent 1.
First, let us consider priority bankruptcy rules, where priorities are described by the
identity, pi(1) = 1, pi(2) = 2, and pi(3) = 3, so first payments to agent 1 should be made, a
3The perfectly divisible case is treated in detail in Section 6.
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E1 L1
1 0 2 2
Table 1: The estate and claims on the estate of agent 1 in Example 1.
possible remainder of the estate to agent 2, and if there is still part of the estate remaining,
payments can be made to agent 3. Since agent 1 has no liability towards himself, it is easily
verified that the set of feasible payments is given by
F1 = {(0, 0, 0), (0, 1, 0), (0, 2, 0), (0, 2, 1), (0, 2, 2)}.
It therefore holds that bpi1 (1) = (0, 1, 0), so the entire estate goes to agent 2.
Second, let us consider the fair proportional bankruptcy rule. In this case we have
F1 = bdprop1 (R+)c = {(0, 0, 0), (0, 1, 1), (0, 2, 2)}.
It follows that bprop1 (1) = (0, 0, 0), so no payments are made to any agent in this case.
Another possibility in defining the proportional rule is to emphasize efficiency rather
than fairness and require that the entire estate be divided. In a different guise, that prob-
lem has been extensively studied in the rich political science literature on apportionment.
Apportionment addresses how to allocate a fixed number of seats among regions according
to their respective numbers of inhabitants as well as the related problem of how to allocate
a fixed number of seats among political parties according to their respective votes. In
bankruptcy problems, the estate Ei plays the role of the fixed number of seats, the agents
in the set I correspond to either regions or the political parties, and the liability Lij to
either the number of inhabitants of region j or the number of votes of political party j.
Balinski and Young (1975) give an overview of many methods for apportionment that
are used in practise, like the Jefferson method (known in the United states as the method of
greatest divisors and in Europe as the method of d’Hondt), the Hamilton method (generally
known as the Vinton method), the Webster method (known as the method of major frac-
tions), and the Huntington method (known as the method of equal proportions). Balinski
and Young (1975) make a new proposal themselves, called the quota method. Not all these
methods qualify as bankruptcy rules. For instance, the Alabama paradox refers to the fact
that the Hamilton method violates monotonicity, a property called house monotonicity in
the apportionment literature.
The quota method of Balinski and Young (1975) is actually not a single solution but
rather a set of solutions. One solution in the set is defined next and we call it the quota
bankruptcy rule. To define it, we need some additional notation. Given a permutation
pi : I → {1, . . . , n}, the unique argument that has the highest priority according to pi
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among the arguments that maximize a function g defined on a subset K of I is denoted
by arg maxpik∈K g(k), so if j ∈ arg maxk∈K g(k) and for every i ∈ arg maxk∈K g(k) it holds
that pi(j) ≤ pi(i), then arg maxpik∈K g(k) = j.
Let some agent i ∈ I with liabilities Li and estate Ei <
∑
j∈I Lij be given and sup-
pose agent i makes a payment Pi ∈ NI0. The set of agents whose payment is below their
proportional share is defined as
Bi(Pi, Ei) = {j ∈ I | Pij < Lij∑
k∈I Lik
Ei}.
Definition 3. Given a vector of liabilities Li ∈ NI0 of agent i ∈ I and a permutation
pi : I → {1, . . . , n}, the quota bankruptcy rule qpii : N0 → NI0 is recursively defined as
follows.
qpii (0) = 0
I .
If 0 < Ei <
∑
j∈I Lij, then
qpiij(Ei) =
{
qpiij(Ei − 1) + 1, if j = arg maxpik∈Bi(qpii (Ei−1),Ei)
Lik
qpiik(Ei−1)+1
,
qpiij(Ei − 1), otherwise.
If Ei ≥
∑
j∈I Lij, then
qpii (Ei) = Li.
The quota bankruptcy rule is defined recursively for increasing values of the estate.
Given some value of the estate Ei, it considers the agents j
′ in the set Bi(qpii (Ei − 1), Ei)
whose payment qpiij′(Ei−1) at estate Ei−1 is strictly below their quota (Lij′/(
∑
k∈I Lik))Ei
at estate Ei. Among those agents, it considers the agents k with the highest ratio of liability
to payment when the payment would be increased by one, Lik/(q
pi
ik(Ei−1)+1), and selects
the agent with the highest priority according to pi to receive the additional unit. It follows
from the results in Balinski and Young (1975) that the quota bankruptcy rule is monotonic.
It is clear that the quota bankruptcy rule always divides the entire estate when the total
liabilities exceed the estate. It is now easily verified that quota bankruptcy rules satisfy
Assumption 1. An interesting property of the quota bankruptcy rule is that it satisfies
b Lij∑
k∈I Lik
Eic ≤ qpiij(Ei) ≤ d Lij∑
k∈I Lik
Eie,
so the payment received by every agent is always in between his quota when rounded down
and his quota when rounded up.
Example 2. We consider again the primitives of Example 1, now assuming that the estate
of agent 1 is subject to the quota bankruptcy rule. As before, priorities are described by
the identity, pi(1) = 1, pi(2) = 2, and pi(3) = 3. It is easily derived that
F1 = {(0, 0, 0), (0, 1, 0), (0, 1, 1), (0, 2, 1), (0, 2, 2)}.
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It therefore holds that qpi1 (1) = (0, 1, 0), so the entire estate goes to agent 2. While efficient,
the quota bankruptcy rule is not fair. Agents 2 and 3 have identical claims on the estate
of agent 1, but receive different payments.
Example 3. As a final example, consider the all-or-nothing bankruptcy rule, in which
either all or none of the claims are being paid. An example of such a rule can be found
in Acemoglu et al. (2015) who study banking networks and assume that banks are forced
to liquidate their projects in full, e.g. because it is difficult to liquidate a fraction of
an ongoing real project. Other examples would arise in applications with supply chain
networks, where either a complete or no delivery takes place.
In Example 1, the set of feasible payments corresponding to the all-or-nothing bankruptcy
rule is given by
F1 = {(0, 0, 0), (0, 2, 2)}.
Using Proposition 1, it is easily shown that all-or-nothing bankruptcy rules satisfy As-
sumption 1.
3 Clearing Payment Matrices
Let some financial network (z, L, b) be given. An n× n payment matrix P ∈ NI×I0 collects
the mutual payments of the agents, that is, Pij is the amount paid by agent i to agent j.
We make the normalizing assumption that Pii = 0 for all i ∈ I. The set of all payment
matrices with this property is denoted by M. The partial order ≤ on M is defined in the
usual way: For P, P ′ ∈M, it holds that P ≤ P ′ if and only if Pij ≤ P ′ij for all (i, j) ∈ I×I.
A payment matrix P ∈ M is feasible if for every i ∈ I it holds that Pi ∈ Fi, so
a payment matrix is feasible if every row i of the matrix belongs to the set of feasible
payments of agent i, that is payments are made in accordance with bankruptcy rules.
The set of all feasible payment matrices is denoted by P , so
P = {P ∈M | ∀i ∈ I, Pi ∈ Fi}.
The sum of the initial endowments of an agent and the payments received from the other
agents determines an agent’s asset value, more formally defined as follows.
Definition 4. Given a financial network (z, L, b) and a payment matrix P ∈M, the asset
value ai(P ) of agent i ∈ I is given by
ai(P ) = zi +
∑
j∈I
Pji.
11
The asset value of an agent will play the role of the estate Ei.
Subtracting the payments as made by an agent from his asset value yields an agent’s
equity. More formally, we have the following definition.
Definition 5. Given a financial network (z, L, b) and a payment matrix P ∈M, the equity
ei(P ) of agent i ∈ I is given by
ei(P ) = ai(P )−
∑
j∈I
Pij = zi +
∑
j∈I
(Pji − Pij) . (2)
If agent i ∈ I has negative equity even when all agents pay all their liabilities, so if
ei(L) = zi +
∑
j∈I
(Lji − Lij) < 0,
then agent i has so-called fundamental default. When an agent defaults only because other
agents are not fully paying their liabilities to him, then the agent is said to have contagion
default.
It holds that∑
i∈I
ei(P ) =
∑
i∈I
zi +
∑
i∈I
∑
j∈I
(Pji − Pij) =
∑
i∈I
zi. (3)
Payment matrices only lead to a redistribution of initial endowments.
Example 4. Consider a financial network (z, L, b) with three agents I = {1, 2, 3} and
endowments and liabilities as presented in Table 2. For every i ∈ I, the bankruptcy rule bi
equals the priority bankruptcy rule bpi where pi is the identity, so agent 1 has priority over
agent 2, who in turn has priority over agent 3.
z L
1 0 2 2
1 2 0 2
1 0 0 0
Table 2: The endowments and liabilities of the agents in Example 4.
The payment matrix P in Table 3 is feasible since each row i is selected from the set
of feasible payments Fi. Agent 1 has equity e1(P ) = 2, but still has unpaid liabilities to
both agents 2 and 3. Agent 2 has negative equity, e2(P ) = −2. The payment matrix P
suffers from two undesirable features. Agent 1 has a positive equity value and outstanding
liabilities. Agent 2 has a negative equity value.
12
z L P a(P ) e(P )
1 0 2 2 0 1 0 3 2
1 2 0 2 2 0 2 2 -2
1 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 3
Table 3: An undesirable payment matrix in Example 4.
To overcome this situation, we extend the notions of priority of creditors and limited
liability defined in the perfectly divisible case for proportional rules by Eisenberg and Noe
(2001) to our discrete setup with general bankruptcy rules.4
Definition 6. Given a financial network (z, L, b), P ∈ M is a clearing payment matrix if
it satisfies the following three properties:
1. Feasibility : P ∈ P .
2. Limited liability : For every i ∈ I, ei(P ) ≥ 0.
3. Priority of creditors : For every i ∈ I, for every P ′i ∈ Fi such that P ′i > Pi it holds
that ai(P )−
∑
j∈I P
′
ij < 0.
A clearing payment matrix is feasible, leads to non-negative equity values, and satisfies
priority of creditors. Notice that priority of creditors is satisfied whenever Pi = Li since
there is no P ′i ∈ Fi with P ′i > Pi in that case.5
The following proposition shows that in case the asset value of an agent is sufficient to
pay all his liabilities, then the agent will do so in a clearing payment matrix.
Proposition 2. Let P be a clearing payment matrix for the financial network (z, L, b). For
every i ∈ I, if ai(P ) ≥
∑
j∈I Lij, then Pi = Li.
Proof. Suppose not. Let i ∈ I be such that ai(P ) ≥
∑
j∈I Lij and Pi < Li. We define
P ′i = Li, which is an element of Fi by Assumption 1. It holds that
ai(P )−
∑
j∈I
P ′ij = ai(P )−
∑
j∈I
Lij ≥ 0,
4Eisenberg and Noe (2001) refers to ‘priority of creditors’ as ‘priority of debt claims’ or ‘absolute
priority’ and to ‘limited liability’ as ‘limited liability (of equity)’.
5In the perfectly divisible setup, priority of creditors is defined as follows by Eisenberg and Noe (2001):
For every i ∈ I, if Pi < Li, then ei(P ) = 0. In the presence of integer payments, this condition is too
strong. We therefore use the requirement in Condition 3 of Definition 6 that agent i ends up with negative
equity if he chooses a feasible payment that is strictly higher, whereas all other agents remain paying the
same.
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so P violates priority of creditors and is therefore not a clearing payment matrix, a con-
tradiction. 2
For the perfectly divisible setup with proportional rules, Eisenberg and Noe (2001) show
that when all endowments are positive, then there is a unique clearing payment matrix.
Although in general multiple clearing payment matrices can co-exist, Eisenberg and Noe
(2001) show that the final value of equity is the same irrespective of the clearing matrix
that is being used. Glasserman and Young (2015) present other conditions to get a unique
clearing payment matrix. For the perfectly divisible setup with general bankruptcy rules,
though not allowing for agent specific bankruptcy rules, uniqueness of final equity values
is shown in Groote Schaarsberg et al. (2013).
The next example shows that in the case with indivisibilities, the clearing payment
matrix with fair proportional bankruptcy rules may not be unique even when all initial en-
dowments are positive. More importantly, the resulting values of equity might be different
as well.
Example 5. As in Example 4, we consider a financial network (z, L, b) with three agents
I = {1, 2, 3} and endowments and liabilities as presented in Table 2, but replace the priority
bankruptcy rules of that example by fair proportional bankruptcy rules.
Table 4 presents the clearing payment matrix P and Table 5 the clearing payment
matrix P . There are no other clearing payment matrices. The matrices P and P induce
different equity values, e(P ) = (1, 1, 1) and e(P ) = (0, 0, 3).
z L P a(P ) e(P )
1 0 2 2 0 0 0 1 1
1 2 0 2 0 0 0 1 1
1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1
Table 4: The clearing payment matrix P in Example 5, fair proportional bankruptcy rules.
z L P a(P ) e(P )
1 0 2 2 0 1 1 2 0
1 2 0 2 1 0 1 2 0
1 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 3
Table 5: The clearing payment matrix P in Example 5, fair proportional bankruptcy rules.
It holds that e1(P ) = e2(P ) = 1, so there is some equity left for both agents 1 and 2
when the payment matrix P is used. Nevertheless, Condition 3 of Definition 6, priority of
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creditors, holds since there is no higher feasible payment compatible with the asset values
of agents 1 and 2.
Although Example 5 shows the possibility of multiple values of equity, the next section
puts bounds on the maximum differences that are possible. For financial applications it
will turn out that the consequences of having multiple equity values are not very serious.
On the other hand, if the application concerns a student exchange network, then some
college not accepting a couple of students may trigger many other colleges doing the same,
and in this case there could be significant effects.
4 Clearing Payment Matrices as Fixed Points
In this section, we characterize a clearing payment matrix as a fixed point of an appropri-
ately defined function and derive the bounds for the difference between the values of equity
for a given agent in any two clearing payment matrices.
Given a financial network (z, L, b), let ϕ : P → P be defined by
ϕij(P ) = bij(ai(P )), P ∈ P , i, j ∈ I.
Proposition 3. Let a financial network (z, L, b) be given. The matrix P ∈ P is a clearing
payment matrix if and only if P = ϕ(P ).
Proof.
(⇒)
Consider some i ∈ I. We define P ′i = ϕi(P ). Since Pi ∈ Fi and bi is monotonic, it holds
that either (a) Pi < P
′
i , or (b) Pi = P
′
i , or (c) Pi > P
′
i .
Case (a). Pi < P
′
i .
We have that
ai(P )−
∑
j∈I
P ′ij = ai(P )−
∑
j∈I
ϕij(P ) = ai(P )−
∑
j∈I
bij(ai(P )) ≥ 0.
This contradicts the fact that P satisfies priority of creditors. We conclude that Case (a)
cannot occur.
Case (c). Pi > P
′
i .
Since P satisfies limited liability, it holds that ei(P ) ≥ 0. Let Ei ∈ N0 be such that
Pi = bi(Ei). From bi(Ei) = Pi > P
′
i = bi(ai(P )), it follows that ai(P ) < Ei. Together with
the fact that∑
j∈I
bij(Ei) =
∑
j∈I
Pij = ai(P )− ei(P ) ≤ ai(P ),
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this implies by Assumption 1 that bi(ai(P )) = bi(Ei) and therefore that P
′
i = Pi, a contra-
diction to Pi > P
′
i . We conclude that Case (c) cannot occur.
It now follows that Case (b) holds, so Pi = P
′
i = ϕi(P ).
(⇐)
1. Feasibility. It holds that P ∈ P by the definition of ϕ.
2. Limited liability. For every i ∈ I, we have that
Pi = ϕi(P ) = bi(ai(P )),
so
ei(P ) = ai(P )−
∑
j∈I
Pij = ai(P )−
∑
j∈I
bij(ai(P )) ≥ ai(P )− ai(P ) = 0.
3. Priority of creditors. Let i ∈ I and P ′i ∈ Fi be such that P ′i > Pi. Let E ′i ∈ N0 be
such that bi(E
′
i) = P
′
i . Since bi(ai(P )) = Pi < P
′
i = bi(E
′
i), monotonicity of bi implies that
E ′i > ai(P ).
Suppose, by contradiction, that ai(P )−
∑
j∈I P
′
ij ≥ 0. Then it holds that∑
j∈I
bij(E
′
i) =
∑
j∈I
P ′ij ≤ ai(P ).
Since E ′i > ai(P ), it follows from Assumption 1 that
Pi = bi(ai(P )) = bi(E
′
i).
We conclude that Pi = P
′
i , a contradiction to the assumption that P
′
i > Pi. 2
A lattice is a partially ordered set in which every pair of elements has a supremum
and an infimum. A complete lattice is a lattice in which every non-empty subset has a
supremum and an infimum. Any finite lattice can be shown to be complete. The infimum
of a two-point set {x, x′} is denoted by x ∧ x′ and its supremum by x ∨ x′.
The matrices in P are partially ordered by ≤, since ≤ is a reflexive, transitive, and
antisymmetric order on P .
Consider two matrices P, P ′ ∈ P . We define the matrices P , P ∈ P by
P i = Pi ∧ P ′i , i ∈ I,
P i = Pi ∨ P ′i , i ∈ I.
Since Fi is totally ordered by ≤, it holds that P i is either equal to Pi or to P ′i . Similarly,
it holds that P i is either equal to Pi or to P
′
i . It is now immediate that P , P ∈ P and that
P ∧ P ′ = P and P ∨ P ′ = P . Every pair of matrices in P therefore has a supremum and
an infimum in P . We conclude that the set P is a complete lattice.
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Proposition 4. Consider a financial network (z, L, b). The set of clearing payment ma-
trices is a complete lattice. In particular, there exists a least clearing payment matrix P−
and a greatest clearing payment matrix P+.
Proof. We show that ϕ is monotone. Let P, P ′ ∈ P be such that P ≤ P ′. For every
i ∈ I, it holds that
ϕi(P ) = bi(ai(P )) = bi(zi +
∑
j∈I
Pji) ≤ bi(zi +
∑
j∈I
P ′ji) = bi(ai(P
′)) = ϕi(P ′),
where the inequality follows from the monotonicity of bi.
By Tarski’s fixed point theorem (Tarski, 1955), the set of fixed points of ϕ is a complete
lattice with respect to ≤ . It follows that the set of fixed points has a least and a greatest
element. By Proposition 3, the set of fixed points of ϕ is equal to the set of clearing pay-
ment matrices. 2
Example 5 shows that two clearing payment matrices may lead to different values of
equity. To analyze the size of the possible differences, we introduce the following notation.
For every i ∈ I, for every Pi ∈ Fi \ {Li}, we define Si(Pi) as the unique successor of Pi, i.e.
the lowest feasible payment vector that is strictly greater than Pi. Note that Si(Pi) is not
defined if Pi = Li.
For every i ∈ I, the number κi equals the maximal difference between total payments
in two consecutive feasible payment vectors for agent i. If Fi consists of a single element,
so Fi = {Li} = {0I}, then we define κi = 1. Otherwise, Fi has at least two elements and
we define
κi = max
Pi∈Fi\{Li}
∑
j∈I
(Sij(Pi)− Pij).
The bankruptcy rules discussed in Section 2 give three typical numbers for κi. If bi is a pri-
ority bankruptcy rule or a quota bankruptcy rule, then κi = 1. If bi is the fair proportional
bankruptcy rule and Li > 0, then κi is at most as large as the number of non-zero liabilities
λi = #{j ∈ I | Lij > 0} of agent i, which in turn is less than the number of agents n. If bi
corresponds to the all-or-nothing bankruptcy rule and Li > 0, then κi =
∑
j∈I Lij equals
the sum of the liabilities of agent i.
The numbers κi for i ∈ I can be used to provide lower and upper bounds on the maxi-
mum difference in equity value that results from two different clearing payment matrices.
Proposition 5. Consider a financial network (z, L, b) and two clearing payment matrices
P and P ′ with P ≤ P ′. For every i ∈ I, the difference between the value of equity at P and
P ′ satisfies −(κi − 1) ≤ ei(P ′)− ei(P ) ≤
∑
j∈I\{i}(κj − 1).
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Proof. We argue first that, for every i ∈ I,
max{0, ai(P )−
∑
j∈ILij} = ai(P )−
∑
j∈IPij − εi(P ) = ei(P )− εi(P ), (4)
where
εi(P ) ∈
{0}, if ai(P ) ≥
∑
j∈I Lij,
{0, . . . , κi − 1}, if ai(P ) <
∑
j∈I Lij.
We distinguish two cases: (a) ai(P ) ≥
∑
j∈I Lij and (b) ai(P ) <
∑
j∈I Lij.
Case (a). ai(P ) ≥
∑
j∈I Lij.
It holds that
max{0, ai(P )−
∑
j∈ILij} = ai(P )−
∑
j∈ILij = ai(P )−
∑
j∈IPij = ei(P ),
where the second equality follows from Proposition 2. It follows that εi(P ) = 0.
Case (b). ai(P ) <
∑
j∈I Lij.
It holds that
εi(P ) = ei(P )−max{0, ai(P )−
∑
j∈ILij} = ei(P ). (5)
Since P is a clearing payment matrix, it follows that εi(P ) ∈ N0. Moreover, we have by
Proposition 3 that∑
j∈IPij =
∑
j∈Ibij(ai(P )) ≤ min{
∑
j∈ILij, ai(P )} = ai(P ) <
∑
j∈NLij.
Since P satisfies priority of creditors, we have that
ai(P )−
∑
j∈I
Sij(Pi) < 0.
Finally, using Equation (5), it follows that
εi(P ) = ei(P ) = ai(P )−
∑
j∈I
Pij ≤ ai(P )−
∑
j∈I
Sij(Pi) + κi ≤ κi − 1.
This completes the proof that Equation (4) holds.
Let some i ∈ I be given. Since P ≤ P ′, we have that
max{0, ai(P )−
∑
j∈ILij} ≤ max{0, ai(P ′)−
∑
j∈ILij},
so it follows from Equation (4) that
ei(P )− εi(P ) ≤ ei(P ′)− εi(P ′).
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Rewriting this inequality, we obtain
ei(P
′)− ei(P ) ≥ εi(P ′)− εi(P ) ≥ −(κi − 1).
Using Equation (3), we find that
ei(P
′)− ei(P ) =
∑
j∈I\{i}
(ej(P )− ej(P ′)) ≤
∑
j∈I\{i}
(κj − 1),
which completes the proof. 2
By Proposition 4, it holds for any clearing payment matrix P that P− ≤ P ≤ P+.
Natural choices in Proposition 5 are therefore P = P− and P ′ = P+.
In Example 5 it holds that κ1 = κ2 = 2 and κ3 = 1. There are only two possible
clearing payment matrices, P and P . It holds that e1(P )− e1(P ) = e2(P )− e2(P ) = −1 =
−(κ1−1) = −(κ2−1), so the lower bound of Proposition 5 is tight. Since e3(P )− e3(P ) =
2 = (κ1 − 1) + (κ2 − 1), the upper bound of Proposition 5 is tight as well.
In a financial network with priority or quota bankruptcy rules, or more generally, in a
financial network where κi = 1 for every i ∈ I, Proposition 5 implies that the difference
between the value of equity for a given agent at the least clearing payment matrix P− and
any clearing payment matrix P is zero. The value of equity is uniquely determined in this
case.
In a financial network with fair proportional bankruptcy rules, the difference between
the value of equity of agent i at the greatest clearing payment matrix P+ and any clearing
payment matrix P is bounded between −λi ≥ −(n − 1) and
∑
j∈I\{i}(λj − 1) ≤ (n −
1)(n− 1− 1) = (n− 1)(n− 2) by Proposition 5. If all bankruptcy rules are all-or-nothing,
then this difference is bounded between −(κi − 1) ≥ −
∑
j∈I Lij and
∑
j∈I\{i}(κj − 1) ≤∑
j∈I\{i}
∑
k∈I Ljk.
5 Decentralized Clearing
The literature on default in financial networks has so far always considered centralized
clearing procedures. In this section, we introduce a large class of decentralized clearing
processes. We show that any process in this class converges to the least clearing payment
matrix. Bounds on equity differences with the greatest clearing payment matrix are given
by Proposition 5.
In a centralized clearing procedure, implicitly all agents are filing for bankruptcy si-
multaneously and a clearing payment matrix is centrally computed. One possibility to do
so is by formulating an integer programming problem where the objective is to maximize
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the total payments that are made subject to feasibility constraints, see also Eisenberg and
Noe (2001) for a similar formulation in the perfectly divisible case with proportional rules.
maxP∈P
∑
i∈I
∑
j∈J Pij,
subject to
∑
j∈I(Pij − Pji) ≤ zi, i ∈ I. (6)
Proposition 6. Consider a financial network (z, L, b). The payment matrix P+ is the
unique solution to the maximization problem in (6).
Proof. Assume the payment matrix P ′ is a solution to the maximization problem
in (6). We show next that P ′ satisfies the conditions of Definition 6, so P ′ is a clearing
payment matrix.
1. Feasibility. Since P ′ ∈ P , feasibility is satisfied, that is payments are made in
accordance with bankruptcy rules.
2. Limited liability. For every i ∈ I, since ∑j∈I(P ′ij − P ′ji) ≤ zi, we have
ei(P
′) = zi +
∑
j∈I
(P ′ji − P ′ij) ≥ 0,
so P ′ satisfies limited liability.
3. Priority of creditors. Suppose there is i′ ∈ I and P ∗i′ ∈ Fi′ such that P ∗i′ > P ′i′ and
ai′(P
′)−
∑
j∈I
P ∗i′j ≥ 0. (7)
Complete the definition of the matrix P ∗ by setting P ∗i = P
′
i for i ∈ I \ {i′}. We have that∑
j∈I
(P ∗i′j − P ∗ji′) =
∑
j∈I
(P ∗i′j − P ′ji′) ≤ ai′(P ′)−
∑
j∈I
P ′ji′ = zi′ +
∑
j∈I
(P ′ji′ − P ′ji′) = zi′ ,
where the inequality follows from (7). For every i ∈ I \ {i′}, it holds that∑
j∈I
(P ∗ij − P ∗ji) =
∑
j∈I
(P ′ij − P ∗ji) ≤
∑
j∈I
(P ′ij − P ′ji) ≤ zi,
where the last inequality follows since P ′ is a solution to the maximization problem in (6).
We have shown that P ∗ satisfies all feasibility constraints of the maximization problem
in (6). Since P ∗ > P ′, we obtain a contradiction to P ′ being an optimal solution.
Consequently, for every i ∈ I, for every P ∗i ∈ Fi such that P ∗i > P ′i , it holds that
ai(P
′)−∑j∈I P ∗ij < 0 and P ′ satisfies priority of creditors.
A solution to the maximization problem in (6) is therefore a clearing payment ma-
trix. We show next that the greatest clearing payment matrix P+, guaranteed to exist by
Proposition 4, satisfies the feasibility constraints of the maximization problem (6).
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It holds that P+ ∈ P . Since P+ satisfies limited liability, for every i ∈ I it holds that
ei(P
+) = zi +
∑
j∈I
(P+ji − P+ij ) ≥ 0.
The proposition now follows from the observation that P+ is the greatest clearing pay-
ment matrix and that the objective function in (6) is strictly monotonic in all entries of P. 2
The only feature of the objective function in maximization problem (6) that is used in
the proof of Proposition 9 is its strict monotonicity in each entry of P. If we replace the
objective function
∑
i∈I
∑
j∈I Pij in (6) by any objective function o : P → R that is strictly
monotonic on P , then we get P+ as the unique solution. So even if the objective function
is such that some agents are favored to others, i.e. carry a higher weight in the objective
function, or if smaller payments are relatively more important than bigger payments, i.e.
the marginal benefits from additional payments are decreasing and the objective function
is concave, it would still be the case that P+ emerges as the unique solution.
Eisenberg and Noe (2001) formulate the fictitious default algorithm to find a clearing
payment matrix for the perfectly divisible case with proportional rules. It starts by as-
suming that all agents pay their liabilities in full and then checks whether defaults occur.
If no first-order default arises, then the algorithm is terminated. Otherwise, it is assumed
that the agents involved in first-order defaults end up with zero equity, whereas the other
agents pay their liabilities in full, a problem that corresponds to solving a system of linear
equations. If no second-order defaults occur, then the algorithm is terminated. Otherwise
it proceeds by setting the equity of first-order and second-order defaulting agents to zero,
and so on. It is shown that this algorithm terminates in at most n steps to the greatest
clearing payment matrix. Variations on this algorithm have been presented in Rogers and
Veraart (2013) and Elliott et al. (2014).
The centralized approaches towards clearing have their limitations. In reality, agents
do not file for bankruptcy simultaneously and even for agents that are declared bankrupt,
the settlement of payments does not occur at the same time. Indeed, not all assets of
a bankrupt agent are equally liquid and the liquidation process may take considerable
time. Moreover, examples like the Lehman bankruptcy or the European sovereign debt
problems involve many different (international) institutions. As emphasized by Elsinger
et al. (2006) and Gai and Kapadia (2010), the complexity of the financial system means
that policymakers have only partial information about the true linkages between financial
intermediaries. The information that is required for a centralized approach is simply not
available.
In this section, we introduce a general class of decentralized clearing processes with the
following features. At each point in time, an agent is selected by means of a process that is
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potentially history-dependent and stochastic. This agent would typically be an agent that
has filed for bankruptcy. Next, the selected agent makes any amount of feasible payments
to the other agents. The amount that is paid depends only on local information and is
determined by a process that again is potentially history-dependent and stochastic. The
only requirement that we make is that the selected agent be eligible, that is can make a
positive incremental payment without ending up with negative equity.
Definition 7. Let (z, L, b) be a financial network. The set of eligible agents at P ∈ P is
equal to
G(P ) = {i ∈ I|∃P ′i ∈ Fi such that P ′i > Pi and ai(P )−
∑
j∈IP
′
ij ≥ 0}.
It is easily verified that a payment matrix P ∈ P violates priority of creditors if and
only if G(P ) 6= ∅.
The requirement of making a payment that does not violate limited liability addresses
another problematic aspect of the centralized approach, which is that the payment matrices
as derived in for instance the intermediate steps of the fictitious default algorithm lead to
negative equity values and are therefore not implementable.
Next, we define the general class of decentralized clearing processes described before.
Definition 8. Let some financial network (z, L, b) be given. A decentralized clearing process
operates as follows.
Step 1 We define k = 1 and P 1 = 0I×I . If G(P 1) = ∅, then stop. Otherwise, continue to
Step 2.
Step 2 Select any agent ik+1 ∈ G(P k) and any payment vector P k+1ik+1 ∈ Fik+1 such that
P k+1ik+1 > P
k
ik+1
and aik+1(P
k) −∑j∈I P k+1ik+1j ≥ 0. The matrix P k+1 is completed by
defining P k+1j = P
k
j for every j ∈ I \ {ik+1}.
Step 3 If G(P k+1) = ∅, then stop. Otherwise, increase the value of k by 1 and return to
Step 2.
We start from P 1 = 0I×I . This payment matrix satisfies feasibility and limited liability,
and violates priority of creditors if and only if G(P 1) 6= ∅. In Step 2 of the process, the
selected eligible agent ik+1 ∈ G(P k) is required to make a positive (not necessarily maximal)
additional payment P k+1ik+1 − P kik+1 . The payment matrix P k+1 clearly satisfies feasibility. It
satisfies limited liability by construction for the selected agent. Since the payments for the
other agents only increase, it can be shown by induction that for them limited liability
is satisfied as well. The payment matrix P k+1 violates priority of creditors if and only if
G(P k+1) 6= ∅.
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There are many alternative ways in which agents can be selected in Step 2 of a decen-
tralized clearing process. Typically, the selection would be determined by the timing of
agents filing for bankruptcy and the timing of the liquidation of their assets. The payment
vector in Step 2 can be the greatest payment vector that satisfies limited liability, but it
is also possible that the assets of a defaulting agent are not all simultaneously liquidated
and therefore sequential payments to the agent’s creditors are made. In this way, a de-
centralized clearing process allows for selling the liquid assets first and the illiquid ones
later.
Although our clearing processes are decentralized, a substantial amount of information
gathering may still be required in order to carry them out. If, for instance, we consider
the big lawsuit resulting from the bankruptcy of a highly connected firm, then even in a
decentralized clearing process, all the legal entities that have a relationship to this highly
connected firm should be at the table, either directly or via representatives, in order to
select a feasible payment vector in Step 2 of Definition 8. For instance, in case the prevailing
bankruptcy rule is a mix of priority and proportional rules, then at the very least all the
liabilities having the highest priority should be determined in order to select a feasible
payment vector. In case all liabilities belong to the same priority class, then the claims
of all the claimants of the firm should be known in order to determine a feasible payment
vector.
We illustrate the decentralized clearing process by means of the following example.
Example 6. As in Examples 4 and 5, we consider the financial network (z, L, b) with three
agents I = {1, 2, 3} and endowments and liabilities as presented in Table 6.
z L
1 0 2 2
1 2 0 2
1 0 0 0
Table 6: The endowments and liabilities of the agents in Example 6.
We first consider the case where b only involves fair proportional bankruptcy rules. The
sets of feasible payments are given by
F1 = {(0, 0, 0), (0, 1, 1), (0, 2, 2)},
F2 = {(0, 0, 0), (1, 0, 1), (2, 0, 2)},
F3 = {(0, 0, 0)}.
We start from P 1 = 0I×I . Under P 1 it holds that G(P 1) = ∅, so no agent is eligible
to be selected. Indeed, agents 1 and 2 both have an asset value of 1 unit, but since
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∑
j∈I(S1j(P
1
1 )−P 11j) =
∑
j∈I(S2j(P
1
2 )−P 12j) = 2, their next higher payment vector requires
an asset value of 2 units. We stop at the least clearing payment matrix P− as derived in
Example 5.
Now let b only involve priority bankruptcy rules, where agent 1 has priority over agent 2
and agent 2 has priority over agent 3. The sets of feasible payments are given by
F1 = {(0, 0, 0), (0, 1, 0), (0, 2, 0), (0, 2, 1), (0, 2, 2)},
F2 = {(0, 0, 0), (1, 0, 0), (2, 0, 0), (2, 0, 1), (2, 0, 2)},
F3 = {(0, 0, 0)}.
Let us start the process again with P 1 = 0I×I . Under P 1, both agents 1 and 2 are eligible to
be selected, G(P 1) = {1, 2}. Suppose agent 1 files for bankruptcy first. Since a1(P 1) = 1,
the only possible payment vector is (0, 1, 0), where agent 1 pays 1 unit to agent 2 and the
payment matrix is updated to P 2 as presented in Table 7.
P 1
0 0 0
0 0 0
0 0 0
P 2
0 1 0
0 0 0
0 0 0
P 3
0 1 0
2 0 0
0 0 0
P 4
0 2 1
2 0 0
0 0 0
P 5
0 2 1
2 0 1
0 0 0
Table 7: The total payments in iterations 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5 in Example 6.
Under P 2 only agent 2 is eligible, G(P 2) = {2}. Since a2(P 2) = 2, there are now two
possible payment vectors for agent 2, (1, 0, 0) and (2, 0, 0). Suppose the liquidator always
selects the maximal payment compatible with limited liability, b2(a2(P
2)) = (2, 0, 0). Agent
2 pays 2 units to agent 1 and 0 units to agent 3. The payment matrix is now P 3 as presented
in Table 7.
Under P 3 only agent 1 is eligible, G(P 3) = {1}. Since a1(P 3) = 3, there are two
possible payment vectors for agent 1, (0, 2, 0) and (0, 2, 1). Under the maximal payment of
b1(a1(P
3)) = (0, 2, 1), agent 1 makes an additional transfer of 1 unit to agent 2 and makes
a transfer of 1 unit to agent 3, and the new payment matrix is equal to P 4. At P 4, it holds
that G(P 4) = {2}, the only possible payment vector is (2, 0, 1), so agent 2 makes a transfer
of 1 unit to agent 3. Since G(P 5) = ∅, there are no more eligible agents and the process is
over at the payment matrix P 5 of Table 7. In this example, the matrix P 5 is the unique
clearing payment matrix.
Proposition 7. Given a financial network (z, L, b), a decentralized clearing process termi-
nates in a finite number of iterations with the least clearing payment matrix P−.
Proof. Finite convergence is satisfied, since total payments made increase by at least
one unit in each iteration and total payments have to be bounded above by the amounts
involved in the liabilities, a finite number.
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Assume that (P 1, . . . , PK) corresponds to the realization of a decentralized process. We
show that PK is a clearing payment matrix by verifying the conditions of Definition 6.
1. Feasibility. In each iteration a feasible payment vector is selected, thus PK ∈ P .
2. Limited liability. It is immediate to verify that P 1 = 0I×I satisfies limited liability.
We proceed by induction. Assume, for some k < K, P k satisfies limited liability. For the
selected agent ik+1 it holds that∑
j∈I
P k+1ik+1j ≤ aik+1(P k) = aik+1(P k+1).
For every agent i ∈ I \ {ik+1}, we have∑
j∈I
P k+1ij =
∑
j∈I
P kij ≤ ai(P k) ≤ ai(P k+1),
where the first inequality follows from the induction hypothesis.
We conclude that P k satisfies limited liability for every k ∈ {1, . . . , K}.
3. Priority of creditors. Suppose PK does not satisfy priority of creditors. It follows
that G(PK) 6= ∅, which contradicts that the decentralized clearing process terminates at
PK .
We have shown that PK is clearing payment matrix. To show that it is the least clearing
payment matrix, let k be the last iteration in {1, . . . , K} such that P k ≤ P−. Notice that
such a k exists since P 1 ≤ P−.
Suppose k < K.We argue first that P k+1 ≤ ϕ(P k). By construction of P k+1ik+1 it holds that∑
j∈I P
k+1
ik+1j
≤ aik+1(P k), so clearly P k+1ik+1 ≤ bik+1(aik+1(P k)) = ϕik+1(P k). For i ∈ I \ {ik+1},
it holds that
P k+1i = P
k
i ≤ bi(ai(P k)) = ϕi(P k),
where the inequality follows from the fact that P k satisfies limited liability.
Then we have that
P k+1 ≤ ϕ(P k) ≤ ϕ(P−) = P−,
where the second inequality follows from the monotonicity of ϕ as shown in the proof of
Proposition 4 and the equality from the fact that P− is a fixed point of ϕ by Proposition 3.
This contradicts the definition of k as the last iteration such that P k ≤ P−.
Consequently, we have that k = K. Since PK ≤ P− and PK is a clearing payment
matrix, it follows that PK = P−. 2
Whereas the centralized procedures yield the greatest payment matrix P+, a decentral-
ized process converges to the least payment matrix P−. Surprisingly, the convergence to
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P− is independent of the precise specification of the decentralized process in the following
sense. The process to select eligible agents is potentially history-dependent and stochastic.
The additional payments are only required to be positive and not necessarily maximal,
taking into account limited liability. They may be determined in a potentially history-
dependent and stochastic way too. What is important is that selected agents pay some
extra amount in accordance with the bankruptcy rules. If payments are not in accordance
with the bankruptcy rules, then one might end up with a different clearing payment matrix.
For instance, in case agents could decide themselves whom to pay, they have incentives to
pay those agents on which they have claims themselves. Obviously, without enforcement
of payments, agents would prefer not to pay at all.
Whether the difference between a centralized procedure and a decentralized process is
substantial or not depends on the values of κi, see Proposition 5. For almost any financial
application, κi is a very small number when compared to the size of the liabilities, and
so the difference between a centralized procedure and a decentralized process will not be
significant.
6 The Perfectly Divisible Case
In this section we analyze the perfectly divisible case and relate it to our integer approach.
A financial network (z, L, d) in the perfectly divisible case consists of endowments z ∈
RI+, a liability matrix L ∈ RI×I+ , and division rules d = (di)i∈I with di : R+ → RI+. We use
the term division rule rather than bankruptcy rule to emphasize that we are operating in
the perfectly divisible setup.
Assumption 2. Let (z, L, d) be a financial network in the perfectly divisible case. For
every i ∈ I, the division rule di is a monotonic function di : R+ → RI+ such that:
1. For every Ei ∈ R+,
∑
j∈I dij(Ei) = min{
∑
j∈I Lij, Ei}.
2. For every Ei ∈ R+, for every j ∈ I, dij(Ei) ≤ Lij.
It can be shown that any division rule satisfying Assumption 2 is continuous.
In Section 2 we defined the proportional division rule dprop, which is easily verified to
satisfy Assumption 2. When all division rules are proportional, we have exactly the setting
of Eisenberg and Noe (2001). The case with general division rules, though not allowing
for agent specific bankruptcy rules, corresponds to the framework of Groote Schaarsberg
et al. (2013).
In Section 2 we provided a construction to turn the proportional division rule into the
fair proportional bankruptcy rule. The next definition extends this construction to any
division rule.
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Definition 9. Given a vector of liabilities Li and a division rule di : R+ → RI+ of agent
i ∈ I, the induced bankruptcy rule bi : N0 → NI0 of agent i is defined by bi = bbdi(R+)ci .
The next result establishes that if di is a division rule satisfying Assumption 2, then
the induced bankruptcy rule bi satisfies Assumption 1.
Proposition 8. Given a vector of liabilities Li and a division rule di : R+ → RI+ of agent
i ∈ I satisfying Assumption 2, the induced bankruptcy rule bbdi(R+)ci satisfies Assumption 1.
Proof. We show that bdi(R+)c being a subset of NI0 is totally ordered by ≤, contains
0I , and its maximal element is Li. The result then follows from Proposition 1.
Monotonicity of di implies that bdi(R+)c is totally ordered by ≤ .
Since di maps into RI+ and
∑
j∈I dij(0) = min{
∑
j∈I Lij, 0} = 0, it follows that di(0) =
0I , so 0I ∈ bdi(R+)c.
Since, for every Ei ∈ R+, for every j ∈ I, dij(Ei) ≤ Lij by Assumption 2.2, it follows
that bdi(R+)c is a subset of NI0, and its maximal element is Li. 2
We have shown in Section 2 that if bi is the fair proportional bankruptcy rule and
Li > 0, then κi is at most as large as the number of non-zero liabilities λi of agent i, which
in turn is less than the number of agents n. The next result shows that the latter inequality
holds for any induced bankruptcy rule.
Proposition 9. Consider a financial network (z, L, b). Let i ∈ I be such that Li > 0 and
the bankruptcy rule bi is induced by a division rule di satisfying Assumption 2. It holds
that κi ≤ λi ≤ n− 1.
Proof. Take any Pi ∈ Fi \ {Li}. Suppose there is j ∈ I such that Sij(Pi) − Pij ≥ 2.
Let Ei, E
′′
i ∈ R+ be such that Pij = bdij(Ei)c and Sij(Pi) = bdij(E ′′i )c. By continuity and
monotonicity of di, there is E
′
i ∈ R+ such that Ei < E ′i < E ′′i and
Pij = bdij(Ei)c < bdij(E ′i)c < bdij(E ′′i )c = Sij(Pi).
By monotonicity of di, we have that Pi < bdi(E ′i)c < Si(Pi). Since bdi(E ′i)c ∈ Fi, this
contradicts the definition of Si(Pi).
Consequently, it holds for every j ∈ I that Sij(Pi)− Pij ∈ {0, 1}, so∑
j∈I
(Sij(Pi)− Pij) =
∑
{j∈I|Lij>0}
(Sij(Pi)− Pij) ≤ #{j ∈ I | Lij > 0} = λi ≤ n− 1,
and therefore
κi = max
Pi∈Fi\{Li}
∑
j∈I
(Sij(Pi)− Pij) ≤ λi ≤ n− 1.
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2The all-or-nothing bankruptcy rule is an example of a bankruptcy rule satisfying As-
sumption 1 that is not induced by any division rule satisfying Assumption 2. Indeed,
suppose i ∈ I is an agent having liabilities Li = (0, 2, 2). Let di be a division rule satisfying
Assumption 2. Since di is continuous, the set bdi(R+)c contains an element fi such that
fi2 = 1, as well as an element f
′
i such that f
′
i3 = 1. Recall from Example 3 that the set of
feasible payments corresponding to the all-or-nothing bankruptcy rule is given by
Fi = {(0, 0, 0), (0, 2, 2)},
so both fi and f
′
i are not part of it.
As before, we use P for the set of feasible payment matrices, so
P = {P ∈ RI×I+ | ∀i ∈ I, Pi ∈ di(R+)}.
A clearing payment matrix is now defined as follows.
Definition 10. Given a financial network (z, L, d) in the perfectly divisible case, P ∈ RI×I+
is a clearing payment matrix if it satisfies the following three properties:
1. Feasibility : P ∈ P .
2. Limited liability : For every i ∈ I, ei(P ) ≥ 0.
3. Priority of creditors : For every i ∈ I, if Pi < Li, then ei(P ) = 0.
Using the approach of Groote Schaarsberg et al. (2013), it can be shown that a clearing
payment matrix exists in the perfectly divisible case and that each clearing payment matrix
leads to the same value of equity, thereby generalizing the same result for the case with
proportional division rules by Eisenberg and Noe (2001). We denote this value of equity
by e∗ ∈ RI+.
The assumption of perfectly divisible payments is clearly an abstraction. We are inter-
ested in the question whether it serves as a good approximation for the case with a smallest
unit of account, when this smallest unit converges to zero.
For m ∈ N, let 1/m be the unit of account. To each financial network (z, L, d) in
the perfectly divisible case, we associate a financial network (z(m), L(m), bd(m)), where
z(m) = bm · zc, L(m) = bm · Lc, and, for every i ∈ I, bdi (m) = bbm·di(R+)ci . Amounts now
correspond to multiples of 1/m, so we have to divide z(m), L(m), and bd(m) by m to
compare them to z, L, and d, respectively.
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Asset and equity values resulting from a payment matrix P ∈ M in the model with
unit of account 1/m are denoted by am(P ) and em(P ), respectively. We have
ami (P ) = zi(m) +
∑
j∈I Pji, i ∈ I,
emi (P ) = a
m
i (P )−
∑
j∈I Pij, i ∈ I.
The following proposition gives an affirmative answer to our question.
Proposition 10. Let (z, L, d) be a financial network in the perfectly divisible case. For ev-
ery m ∈ N, let Pm be a clearing payment matrix of the financial network (z(m), L(m), bd(m)).
Then limm→∞(1/m) · em(Pm) = e∗.
Proof. Since ((1/m) · Pm)m∈N is a bounded sequence, we can assume without loss of
generality that it converges to a matrix P .
We show that P is a clearing payment matrix for the financial network (z, L, d) in the
perfectly divisible case by verifying the three conditions of Definition 10.
1. Feasibility. Take some i ∈ I. It holds that Pmi ∈ bm · di(R+)c, so (1/m) · Pmi =
(1/m) · bm · di(Emi )c for some Emi ∈ R+. It follows that (1/m) · bm · di(Emi )c = bdi(Emi )cm,
where bxcm denotes the greatest multiple of 1/m that is less than or equal to x ∈ R+. The
Hausdorff distance of the point bdi(Emi )cm to the compact set di(R+) is less than or equal
to 1/m under ‖ · ‖∞. It then follows that
P i = lim
m→∞
1
m
· Pmi = lim
m→∞
bdi(Emi )cm ∈ di(R+).
2. Limited liability. Take some i ∈ I. By limited liability in Definition 6, emi (Pm) ≥ 0,
so (1/m) · emi (Pm) ≥ 0, and
ei(P i) = lim
m→∞
(1/m) · emi (Pm) ≥ 0.
3. Priority of creditors. Assume i ∈ I is such that P i < Li. For m sufficiently large, it
holds that Pmi < bm · Lic. By priority of creditors in Definition 6 it follows that
ami (P
m) <
∑
j∈I
Smij (P
m
i ) ≤
∑
j∈I
Pmij + n− 1,
where Smi (P
m
i ) denotes the unique successor of P
m
i . We find that
emi (P
m) = ami (P
m)−
∑
j∈I
Pmij < n− 1,
so
ei(P i) = lim
m→∞
(1/m)emi (P
m) ≤ 0.
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Since ei(P i) satisfies limited liability, it follows that ei(P i) = 0.
We conclude that the matrix P is a clearing payment matrix in the sense of Defini-
tion 10, so e(P ) = e∗, and therefore
lim
m→∞
1
m
· em(Pm) = e(P ) = e∗.
2
A decentralized clearing process in the spirit of Definition 8 can also be defined in
the perfectly divisible setup. We show by means of an example that in the perfectly
divisible setup, convergence of a decentralized clearing process might require infinitely
many iterations even if in every Step 2 of the process the highest payment vector consistent
with limited liability is selected.
Example 7. As in Example 5, we consider a financial network (z, L, d) with three agents
I = {1, 2, 3} and endowments and liabilities as presented in Table 8, but now do not assume
a smallest unit of account, so have proportional division rules instead of fair proportional
bankruptcy rules. The unique clearing payment matrix and the resulting asset and equity
values are presented in Table 8 as well.
z L P a(P ) e(P )
1 0 2 2 0 1 1 2 0
1 2 2 0 1 1 0 2 0
1 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 3
Table 8: The financial network and the unique clearing payment matrix in Example 7,
when using the proportional division rule.
We study a decentralized clearing process and start with the situation with agents
making no transfers, P 1 = 0I×I . Under P 1, both agents 1 and 2 are eligible to be selected,
since both of them have positive assets and positive liabilities. Assume the liquidator
starts with agent 1 and requires him to make the maximal payment vector satisfying
limited liability, d1(a1(P
1)) = (0, 1/2, 1/2). At P 2 only agent 2 is eligible and the maximal
payment vector satisfying limited liability is d2(a2(P
2)) = (3/4, 0, 3/4). Proceeding in this
way, we obtain the sequence of payment matrices as presented in Table 9. Agents 1 and 2
are selected in an alternating fashion with their maximal payment vector consistent with
limited liability. The process takes infinitely many iterations, so does never stop.
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P 1
0 0 0
0 0 0
0 0 0
P 2
0 1/2 1/2
0 0 0
0 0 0
P 3
0 1/2 1/2
3/4 0 3/4
0 0 0
P 4
0 7/8 7/8
3/4 0 3/4
0 0 0
P 5
0 7/8 7/8
15/16 0 15/16
0 0 0
. . .
Table 9: The total payments in iterations 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5 in Example 7.
7 Conclusion
Motivated by a large literature on contagion in financial networks, we study bankruptcy
problems in a network environment, thereby generalizing the literature on bankruptcy
problems that consider the division of a single estate among multiple claimants. An im-
portant difference with the case of a single estate is that in a network environment, the
value of the estate is endogenous as it depends on the extent to which other agents pay
their liabilities.
The systemic risk literature on financial networks has considered a number of centralized
procedures to find a clearing payment matrix and the emphasis has been on finding the
greatest clearing payment matrix. The centralized procedures assume a great amount of
coordination and information that is typically not available.
In this paper we introduce a large class of decentralized clearing processes to select
agents and force them to liquidate their assets. We require that each iteration in such
a process satisfies limited liability. The required payments can therefore be implemented
at every step. We find that for any decentralized clearing process in the class, there is
convergence to the least clearing payment matrix in a finite number of iterations.
To facilitate the definition of the class of decentralized clearing processes, it is convenient
to work in a discrete framework, unlike the entire literature on systemic risk. Also unlike
this literature, which invariably has focused on proportional bankruptcy rules, we allow
for general bankruptcy rules. Apart from the already mentioned financial applications,
other examples where our model applies are for instance international student exchange
networks and job processing by a network of servers.
We define the notion of a clearing payment matrix for our discrete setup as a payment
matrix that satisfies feasibility, limited liability, and priority of creditors. We show that
such payment matrices exist and that they constitute a complete lattice, so in particular
there is a least and a greatest clearing payment matrix. Contrary to the perfectly divisible
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setup, it is not the case that all payment matrices induce the same value of equity. It
therefore matters which payment matrix is being used. We derive tight bounds on the
maximal differences in equity values that can result from using different clearing payment
matrices.
We show that when the unit of account is sufficiently small, which would be the case in
most financial applications, the final values of equity as determined by any decentralized
process are essentially the same as the ones determined by a centralized procedure. As a
policy implication, it is not necessary to collect and process all the sensitive data of all the
agents simultaneously and run a centralized clearing procedure.
The results of our paper apply to a setting where the values of the liabilities are not
affected by the liquidation process itself. A number of authors, most notably Cifuentes
et al. (2005) and Shin (2008), have argued that when assets are illiquid, so have less than
perfectly elastic demand curves, then sales by distressed institutions depress the market
prices of such assets. In the setup of this paper, any decentralized clearing process leads
to the same clearing payment matrix. When the values of the endowments depend on
the clearing process itself, then such a result is likely to change. However, as we have
already noted, a decentralized clearing process allows for selling the liquid assets first and
the illiquid ones later, thereby mitigating such effects.
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